Virologists who succeeded in engineering a virulent version of the dreaded H5N1 flu virus are not allowed to publish their findings in scientific journals. An US committee explains that the risks are too high.
Very few people had even heard of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) before its publications last week in both leading magazines Science and Nature. The committee consists of scientists and security experts (partly from the FBI) and it is part of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), the same NIH that has funded Professor Ron Fouchier’s research into H5N1 at the Erasmus University and Medical Centre since 2005. With only five mutations, Prof. Fouchier succeeded in creating a virulent version of the avian flu virus that transmits between mammals. This modification, which hasn’t been found in the wild, makes the virus extremely contagious and, in combination with its high mortality rate (59%), a very dangerous pathogen.
In a defense of its decision not to print details of the research conducted by Prof. Fouchier in Science, and similar work by the Japanese virologist, Kawaoka, in Nature, the NSABB argues that the ability to engineer viruses presents a risk that it “will be deliberately misused and that the consequences could be
catastrophic”. The NSABB’s decision to censor the publications and impose a moratorium has triggered a heated debate.
Dr David Koepsell, philosopher at TU Delft’s TPM faculty, has recently published the article ‘On Genies and Bottles: Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and Dangerous Technology R&D in the magazine Science and Engineering Ethics’. He appreciates the Board’s decision: “If their conclusion is that the possibility of harmful uses outweighs any scientific benefit, then I would support that position. In my article I propose a utilitarian calculus in which you have to weigh the potential risks against the scientific benefit. I think that if they can foresee more possibility of very harmful use of that knowledge than any real scientific benefit from publishing it, then I think it’s a rational decision and it’s also ethical.”
So, how does this calculus work? “In my article I use the example of Australian mouse pox research. It was originally designed to help keep mouse populations low by engineering mouse pox, so it would bust through immunity. But the findings of the research were directly applicable to smallpox, too. It would in theory allow people to engineer a very virulent form of smallpox. In that case I believe that the possibility of catastrophic harm outweighs any of the scientific benefits that are proposed or intended.”
The NSABB recognises the need for vaccine research, since a similar virus may one day pop up in the wild: “With (genomic microbiology) has come unprecedented potential for better control of infectious diseases and significant societal benefit.” But it also fears misuse. One of the committee members, FBI special agent Edward You, acknowledges the need for this kind of research but says the committee is especially concerned about uncontrolled breakouts from insufficiently secure labs. “Those are very serious.”
For now the NSABB has proposed a moratorium, which it hopes will not unduly hinder progress: “With proper diligence and rapid achievement of a consensus on a proper path forward, this could have little detrimental effect on scientific progress but significant effect on diminishing risk.” That may sound plausible, but Prof. Fouchier and colleagues fear even more surveillance and administration.
